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Abstract The 1815 constitution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands estab-
lished a deferential control on the sovereign power to declare war and conclude
treaties. Following articles 57 and 58, international agreements could be concluded
and ratiﬁed by the monarch, save for peacetime cessions of territory. The consti-
tutional committee’s debates treat the matter rather hastily. William I (1772–1843)’s
role at the establishment of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands had been so
decisive, that the advent of a less qualiﬁed successor seemed inconceivable. The
monarch personiﬁed the common interest. Foreign policy, the privileged terrain of
princes and diplomats, was judged unsuitable for domestic political bickering.
Finally, the Estates Generals’ budgetary powers were seen as an indirect brake on
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potential royal martial ardours. The incidental objections formulated by Jan Jozef
Raepsaet, a Southern conservative publicist, show the more structural deﬁciencies of
the constitution as a pact between the monarch and the nation. Leaning both on
feudal law and law of nations doctrine, Raepsaet demonstrated how William I had
been dressed in Napoleon’s clothes. The King had a nearly unchecked competence
in foreign affairs, beyond the usual Old Regime safeguards, contrary to
Enlightenment criticism of autocratic rule. John Gilissen aptly labeled William I as a
“monocrat”. Vattel or Pufendorf’s opinion on the ruler as a mere usufructuary
seemed to have evaporated. Raepsaet’s arguments on the inconsistent nature of Art.
57 and 58 are echoed in the 1831 Belgian constitution’s Art. 67—subjecting most
treaties to parliamentary consent—as well in Thorbecke’s criticism of the document.
1 Introduction
The Constitution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1815 ranks as one of
the restoration constitutions of post-Napoleonic Europe. Looked at from a distance,
the text is the product of a creative moment of European statecraft. The Congress of
Vienna (1814–1815) crafted a new state as the cornerstone of its system of col-
lective security. The Catholic Belgian provinces united with the mostly Protestant
Dutch, under the wings of a newly-created sovereign King, descendent from a
German dynasty, the house of Nassau. The restoration had to incorporate some
acquis of the French Revolution.1 Even before the beheading of Louis XVI in 1793,
the French monarch had agreed to the constitutionalization of the monarchy of
Divine Right. If the monarchy could return after Napoleon, it would have to accept
the presence of the nation.
The story of the 1815 constitution is at the crossroads of two theories on the
limitation of monarchical power. On the one hand, Old Regime thinking on col-
lective government, divided between the monarch and his loyal elites, as exem-
pliﬁed in Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois, or in Fénelon’s criticism of Louis
XIV’s authoritarian reign.2 On the other hand, revolutionary theories of national
representation, as embodied in Siéyes’ writings. From a genealogical perspective,
William I’s constitutions of 1814 and 1815 contained many elements prevalent in
the Belgian Constitution of 1831,3 or of present-day constitutional orders. Yet, its
modernity can also be questioned. The most evident angle of approach is that of the
lack of balance between the legislative and executive power in the domestic ﬁeld.
This contribution proposes to add a less-studied, but crucial aspect of sovereignty:
the right to wage war and conclude treaties. I argue that this case embodies all
aspects of the ambiguous relationship between monarchical rule and national
1De Waresquiel (2015).
2Bély (1996, 243–257).
340% of all articles, see Gilissen (1979a, 405).
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representation. If constitutional precedence was an issue, it counted as such for both
sides. Both for those who favored a stronger restoration monarch, and for elite
resistance to the acquis of the revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes.
If the discussions on the constitutional regime of foreign relations have been
rather scarce, our attention should be aroused by the radical change in formulation
between the 1815 constitution and the 1831 Belgian constitution, or, at an even
further distance, the 1848 constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.4 At one
end of this spectrum, political liberalism has introduced ministerial responsibility
and the primacy of the legislative branch over the executive. Yet, surprisingly, some
liberal criticisms echo those of more conservative, Old Régime-thinking.5 In the
middle, the 1815 constitution has put William I in Napoleon’s clothes.6 In the
words of Cornelis Van Maanen (1769–1846), president of the highest jurisdiction in
the North and William’s minister of Justice, “Den prins in den plaats van den
Keizer stellen” (putting the Prince in the Emperor’s place).7 William’s monarchy
was ‘tempered’ by a Constitution, but was in no way a representative regime.8
The discussion on power sharing in foreign affairs necessitates a synthesis of two
strands in legal history. On the one hand, constitutional history. On the other, the
history of international law. The main difference in narrative between these two
angles lies precisely in the modern nature of restoration constitutions. Whereas the
acquis of the French Revolutions seems evident in the domestic sphere, this is not
the case for international relations. Looked at as a system of horizontal interaction
between sovereign entities, international law did not undergo a fundamental
transformation at the Congress of Vienna. The French Convention tried to subvert
the principle of non-intervention between sovereign states, by calling for the lib-
eration of populations all over Europe.9 The Congress of Vienna had the exact
opposite intention: the restoration of the Droit public de l’Europe.10 Legitimate
dynasties could return where they had been chased. Constitutional arrangements
were an affair of every state distinctly. Intervention was approved in the following
meetings of the Great Powers (Aachen, Verona, Laibach), when the repression of
liberal revolts was on the agenda. Movements in Spain, Italy or Germany were
forcefully struck down. The Fundamental Act of the German Confederation even
forbade constitutional provisions undermining the monarch’s right to rule.
4Van Sas and Te Velde (1998).
5Witte (2016a).
6Reproach by Van Hogendorp to Van Maanen, Koch (2013, 241); Thorbecke judged that the
French period had been of greater importance to the Dutch state than anything achieved after 1813
or before 1848, Worst (1992).
7Van Hogendorp, Geheime Aanteekeningen, quoted by Colenbrander (1908), I, xliii. This can be
explained by a ‘lack of schooling in public law’ in the Northern delegation. See further in this
chapter on the seemingly ill-thought through design of the constitution to William I’s beneﬁt.
Bornewasser (1983b, 228).
8Bornewasser (1983b, 233); See further De Haan et al. (2013).
9Steiger (2015, 170), Bélissa (1998).
10Gentz (1806).
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Starting from this opposition, one would expect the provisions of the 1815 con-
stitution to allot a greater competence to the national representation, to the detriment
of the monarch. Conversely, it would not come across as illogical for Old Régime
doctrine and case law to consecrate the King’s exclusive right to govern international
relations. In the following paragraphs, I will ﬁrst sketch the general characteristics of
the 1815 constitution (2) and its international context (3), before turning to the right to
conclude treaties and to declare war, as seen from the angle of the law of nations (4).
In domestic opposition to Dutch centralizing ideas, the ﬁgure of the conservative
catholic publicist Jan Jozef Raepsaet should attract our attention (5). Finally, I will
briefly consider the differences with the situation post 1831 (conclusion).
2 The Dutch-Belgian Constitution of 1815
The adoption of the 1814 Constitution in the North guided institutional develop-
ments. Whereas the North had known a decentralized, almost confederal system
under the Dutch Republic (1585–1795), the Batavian Revolt of 1795 had turned
this upside-down, by installing a centralized regime.11 This type of administration
was alien to the constitutional traditions of the South, which relied on privileges and
freedoms, regularly invoked against the monarch. The opponents to Joseph II
(1741–1790) and the French Revolution clung to a system of a ‘liberté sage et bien
ordonnée’, not to ‘ces droits pompeux et extravagans de l’homme, que les Français
ont proclamés que pour les fouler aux pieds’.12 Yet, in the eyes of 19th century
liberals, such as the legal scholar Thorbecke (1798–1872), the constitution of 1814
was nothing more than ‘a Napoleonic regulated state with a constitutional
façade’.13 A radical change had thus taken place.
Themerger of North and South was legitimized with historical arguments. Yet, the
divergent options taken at crucial instances of the early modern and revolutionary
periods turned this into a hybrid and ill-conceived memorial reconstruction. The
constitution maintained the precedence among provinces adopted under Emperor
Charles V (1506–1555), referred to the Southern tradition of inaugurations, mirroring
a tradition of contractual monarchy, but chose a radically different path in its essential
provisions. The emphasis on provincial autonomy in the preamble, as if a return to the
situation of 1572 would have been possible, was only symbolical.14 In reality, central
administrative supervision put these authorities, erstwhile the most powerful in both
North and South, under tutelage (art. 155). Gijsbert Karel Van Hogendorp (1762–
1834), who had invited William to return to the North in 1813,15 would soon see his
invented tradition evaporate. VanMaanen’s centralized bureaucracy would take over.
11Van Sas (2005).
12Colenbrander (1908, I, XXXIX).
13Bornewasser (1983a, 208).
14Bornewasser (1983a, 216), Judo and Van de Perre (2016).
15Bornewasser (1983a, 213).
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The text adopted in July 1815 by the Joint Constitutional Committee was
considerably longer (234 articles against 146 in the 1814 Constitution16), but did
not differ on fundamental points. A speciﬁc prescription for the monarch’s sub-
mission to the national representation was lacking.17 Legislative powers were
jointly exercised by the monarch and the Estates-General (Art. 105), representing
the nation as in the French 1791 constitution (Art. 77). Yet, the repartition between
the executive (where the King acted alone) and legislative branches had been left to
constitutional practice. A few situations were directly attributed to the
Estates-General, but they constituted exceptions.18 Conformable to e.g. the
‘Monarchical principle’ enshrined in Art. 57 of the Vienna Final Act on the German
Confederation,19 the King had the residuary competence to act in all cases not
explicitly attributed to the legislature.20
This created a besluitenregering (government by decree), one of the main causes
of the Belgian insurrection of 1830.21 A supplementary lacuna was William’s right
to deliver dispensations with regards to legislative acts, after consulting the highest
court of the realm, the Hoge Raad. This was conceived as an exceptional clause, for
cases where the delegates of the Estates would not be able to meet in time. Even
more, due to William’s conflictenbesluiten (‘conflict of attribrution’-decrees),
issued in 1822, the King excluded judicial review of administrative acts, claiming
the competence for himself, as head of government. Provincial Governors had the
duty to intervene in court cases where the judge threatened to scrutinize adminis-
trative acts, and order for the case to be conferred to the King.22 Regarding the
relationship of the executive branch to the Estates-General, ministerial responsi-
bility was not a case of the national representation, but the King’s affair. Prevention
of abuse relied on the personal discretion of the monarch, and on nothing more.23
The Constitution of 1815 was rejected by the assembled ‘notable’ ﬁgures in the
South.24 796 negative and 527 positive votes were however turned around in a
16Raepsaet (1838, 273–300).
17Alen (1984, 664).
18Alen (1984, 665).
19Bornewasser (1983b, 234).
20Gilissen (1979a, 402).
21Gilissen (1979a, 404), note 1 cites 1710 royal and 1075 ministerial decrees published in the
ofﬁcial journal Pasinomie, against 381 laws voted by the Estates-General. See also Koch (2015).
22William took this decision against the majority of his Council of State, which he clearly saw as
an Ancien Régime-council a latere principis, wherein the (qualitatively) sanior pars could ulti-
mately prevail over a quantitative majority, Bornewasser (1983b, 242). Governors were agents of
William’s central administration, and counterbalanced the provincial estates. This system had been
explicitly excluded by the Constitutional Committee in 1815. See Alen (1984, 692).
23Alen (1984, 666).
24Since a national representation had been lacking, an assembly of 1604 ‘notable’ ﬁgures, rep-
resenting grosso modo 0.02% of the population, had been composed on the advice of Van der
Capellen, William I’s governor-general Bornewasser (1983b, 232). Raepsaet derided this assem-
bly’s composition: ‘on y voyait accolés à quelque peu de personnes comme il faut, des noms
inconnus dans l’arrondissement, des petits commis de bureau, des gens qui ne possédaient pas un
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more favourable result for the monarch (934 pro, 796 contra25). William declared
the constitution adopted on 24 August 1815. Yet, the Southern ecclesiastical
authorities as well as the nobility rejected the constitutional system.26 The recog-
nition of freedom of conscience (Art. 190), in the line of Joseph II’s reforms, or the
insufﬁcient checks on monarchical power, in a Montesquieuan sense, went against
their interests. Most of the Belgian provinces had rejected the document, save for
the districts of Hasselt, Leuven, Liège, Verviers, Luxemburg, Neufchâteau and
Diekirch.27 Louis Hymans (1829–1884), liberal member of parliament talked of the
Belgian people being abducted by the Great Powers, and delivered to the greedy
Dutch sovereign as a ‘troupeau de moutons’.28
The joint Constitutional Committee, which had met in The Hague in Spring
1815, consisted of a haphazard and divided Southern delegation and a more robust
Northern bloc. Cornelis Van Maanen (minister of Justice), Frederik Roëll (future
minister of the Interior, 1767–1835), Cornelis Theodorus Elout (1767–1841, future
minister of Finance) and Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp defended the outcome of
the 1814 constitution. Among the Belgian delegation, the more conservative
members François-Théodore de Thiennes (future president of William I’s First
Chamber, 1745–1822) and Raepsaet offered opposition, but were not able to prevail
on issues of paramount importance. Raepsaet even left the Committee’s sessions on
19 June 1815, eleven days before the end of negotiations.29
The ﬁnal version (13 July 1815) saw the creation of a First Chamber within the
Estates-General, wherein the King could appoint forty to sixty members over 40 for
life, on the basis of their merit, birth or fortune (Art. 8030). This chamber, nicknamed
‘la ménagerie du roi’,31 only had the competence to approve or to reject texts
coming out of the Second Chamber. This chamber of 110 deputies was elected
pouce de terre, des personnes mal notées, des juges, des administrateurs destitués du temps des
Français pour corruption et concussion, etc.’ Raepsaet (1838, 186).
25Colenbrander (1908, II, 615–617).
26Letter by Bishop de Broglie of Ghent to the clergy of his diocese, Raepsaet (1838, 358).
William I added 281 abstentionists to the 527 votes in favour of the constitution, as well as 126
votes motivated on religious grounds. William I motivated this by pointing to the second of the
1814 eight articles, installing an equal treatment between the different religions in his Kingdom,
Gilissen (1979, 402), Bornewasser (1983b, 232).
27In Ypres and Antwerp, not a single vote was cast in favour of the Constitution. In Turnhout and
Namur, only one. The assemblies in Mons and Brussels rejected the text with a slight margin.
Ghent, Courtrai or Tournai overwhelmingly turned it down. Etienne De Gerlache (1785–1871), a
catholic nobleman, was a member of the Estates-General’s Second Chamber (1824–1830). He
presided over the commission in charge of the draft of the 1831 Belgian Constitution, was elected
in the House of Representatives (1831–1832) and ended his career as president of the Belgian
Court of Cassation (until 1867). His words are, of course, to be interpreted through the lens of
Belgian 19th century patriotism. See De Gerlache (1842, I, 310).
28Hymans (1869).
29Meyer to Raepsaet, The Hague, 30 June 1815, Raepsaet (1838, 322–323).
30Stevens (2016).
31Romein (1961, III, 65).
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indirectly by the provincial estates. Although the South was demographically pre-
dominant, seats were evenly split between North and South.32 The provincial estates
were divided in electoral colleges for nobility, cities, and the countryside. Provincial
borders, as established ﬁrst by the Treaty of Münster in 1648 (which separated parts
of Flanders and Brabant) and consequently by the French annexation of 1795 (which
partitioned the province of Flanders) were not altered, mainly as a consequence of
the re-opening of the Scheldt. The Estates-General and government would become
alternating between Brussels, the traditional administrative high point of the
Habsburgs, and The Hague, ancient capital of the county of Holland.
3 International Context
Prenez la nouvelle Constitution de Hollande, huit articles de Londres et vingt-quatre
personnes dont bien six ont de la conscience et de l’instruction. Mettez tout cela ensemble
hermétiquement fermé à La Haye; secouez bien à plusieurs reprises, observant de choisir
un tems bien chaud et surtout bien orageux. Laissez fermenter pendant environ deux mois
et vous retrouverez les huit articles de Londres, la nouvelle Constitution de Hollande et les
24 personnes, le tout un peu froissé. Et la liqueur est faite, il faut la boire.33
The constitution’s preamble afﬁrmed that William’s sovereignty over the Low
Countries was a purely domestic affair. The peace treaties that ‘paciﬁed Europe’,
negotiated in Vienna while the Committee was meeting in The Hague, were of a
purely declaratory nature. Yet, the speciﬁc development of events from 1813 to
1815 cannot be understood without a clearer view of European diplomacy. When
William of Orange proclaimed himself sovereign in the Belgian provinces
(1 August 1814), the monarch pointed to the ‘magnanimity of Europe’s sovereigns’
and the political system they had projected to design as the main cause of the
extension of his own power.34 Even if the creation of the United Kingdom may
appear novel, it was a logical consequence of several earlier designs to employ the
Southern Netherlands as a stabilizer of international relations.
From the separation of the Netherlands on (1568–1648), the Southern Netherlands
had become a military contact zone between France, the Dutch Republic and the
German space. Ruled at a distance from Madrid, their physical defense had become
near-impossible and too expensive. Subsequent plans of partition between France and
the Dutch, between Britain and the Dutch, or the creation of an “independent canton
republic” did not materialize. Yet, from 1698 on, the Dutch obtained the right to
occupy several fortresses. The 1715 Barrier Treaty made their presence a precondi-
tion to the transfer of sovereignty to Emperor Charles VI of Habsburg.
32Bornewasser (1983b, 232). The 1814 constitution counted 55 seats for the Northern provinces of
Guelders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Frise, Overrijssel, Groningen, (North-)Brabant and Drenthe.
The 1815 constitution added the same number for the more populous Belgian provinces, counting
3.25 million inhabitants against just two in the North, Romein (1961, III, 65).
33Anonymous pamphlet against the union of North and South, 1815. Anon (1815) Pourquoi faut-il
une nouvelle constitution? (Royal Library, Prints, II 86.908 A 1/5).
34Raepsaet (1838, 348–349).
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William of Orange’s sovereignty as prince was recognized for the North in 1813.
An ‘extension’ was part of a deal between Britain and the Dutch. Britain was the
active promotor of William’s ascent to the ﬁrst rank of European monarchs.
William needed compensation in two regards. First, as dispossessed German ruler.
This legitimized his sovereignty over Luxemburg, which had traditionally been part
of the Southern Netherlands, as Grand-Duke. In this quality, William counted as a
member of the German Confederation.35 Second, as head of state of Holland, which
lost the Cape colony to Britain during the Napoleonic Wars.36 By extending
William’s sovereignty to the Meuse, Britain would interpose a neutral buffer
between France and the spectacularly aggrandized Kingdom of Prussia.37 The Eight
Articles of London, adopted in June 1814 in a diplomatic conference with Britain,
Prussia, Russia and Austria, imposed a “perfect amalgam” for the union of North
and South, imposing the necessary amendments to the 1814 constitution.38 This
would prove to be rather illusory. William could not pursue his state-building
adventure without this international support. Whereas his own father had been
chased in 1787 and only restored with Prussian help, William of Orange obtained
more ‘with a single penstroke, than the big sword of his ancestors William the
Silent, Maurice or Frederick Henry had ever done’.39 Consequently, the con-
struction, establishment and ﬁrst years of the United Kingdom were also those of a
‘special relationship’ of tutelage under British aegis.40 Dutch afﬁrmations of the
contrary—the Dutch people had spontaneously invited William to return-
emphasized this fragility.41
4 The Right to Declare War (Art. 57-58)
The 1815 constitution has drawn attention from scholars for its domestic implica-
tions. The creation of a First Chamber, the role of Provinces or the recognition of
many freedoms and liberties allow for a continuity or a more genealogical approach
with regards to present-day positive law. Yet, one of the most essential attributions
of sovereignty remains outside the perimeter of discussions: the right to wage war
and conclude treaties. William’s sovereignty could only be full in the arena of
European sovereigns when the constitution deﬁned the extent to which the monarch
could represent the state externally.
35Van Sas (1981, 283).
36Van Sas (1981, X, 280).
37Prussia equally obtained the right to occupy the fortress of Luxemburg. Although William was
its ruler, the Grand-Duchy served as a common buffer against France, Bornewasser (1983b, 225).
38And thus not its replacement by an entirely new text, Raepsaet (1838, 128). For a published
version of the text, see Ibid., VI, 253–256.
39De Gerlache (1842, I, XV).
40Van Sas (1985).
41Van Sas (1981, 285).
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Within the range of possibilities, from full royal control to full parliamentary
participation, the 1815 constitution stands out as a more authoritarian restoration
constitution. The preamble already indicated that the Committee had not thought it
wise to limit William’s foreign competence, in view of the monarch’s personal
wisdom and good conduct in foreign affairs. As such, this reasoning, in continuity
with the 1814 Northern constitution, fails to incorporate the possibility of a less
capable successor. This is even more surprising in view of the traditional distrust
against the monarch in the Low Countries. Philip II of Spain was chased in the
North, Joseph II was declared destitute in the South.
Art. 57 (Art. 37 of the 1814 constitution) delegated the right to declare war or
make peace to the King. Only the information considered appropriate for the security
of the Kingdom could be communicated to the Estates-General. Art. 58 (Art. 38 of
the 1814 constitution) conferred the right to conclude and ratify all alliances and
treaties onto the King. The Estates-General had a right to be informed, but nothing
more. The only exception, added in 1815, constituted in the cession of territory in
peacetime, which required the approbation of the nation’s representatives. In war-
time, decisions could be so urgent, that the monarch could not be hindered.
Raepsaet argued that this was contrary to the most distinguished authors of the law
nations. Yet, WillemQueijsen (member of the Council of State, 1754–1817) opposed
that the royal decision to separate a part of his territory from the rest, could not
become subject of political games within the national representation. If the
Estates-General could be in a position as to prevent the King from concluding a treaty,
and oblige him to continue a ﬁght against his own wishes, Queijsen added, he would
not be the Head of Government any more, and be deprived of his royal dignity.42 Van
Hogendorp nuanced this position. William I would not be completely unrestrained in
his foreign policy actions. War was the most costly of all state activities. Precisely the
budget had been listed as one of the rare speciﬁc competences of the national rep-
resentation. Extraordinary expenditures such as war did not fall within the decennial
vote of the ordinary budget.43 Moreover, tying foreign policy to parliamentary
consent would have gone further than the British system. TheKing’s negotiations and
treaties fell under the Crown Privilege, as Van Hogendorp thought. David Armitage’s
analysis of parliamentary debates after the United States of America’s Declaration of
Independence seems to provide support for this thesis. The names of Pufendorf and
Vattel were depicted as ‘lubrications and fancies of foreign writers’.44
From an external point of view, the right to wage war had been subject to
theological bellum justum-theories up to the middle of the 17th century. The
auctoritas or authority to wage war was conﬁned to the supreme heads of the
Christian world, in an attempt to rein in aggression. Yet, the confessional frag-
mentation of Europe multiplied the number of sovereign actors. Early modern law
of nations-theory constructed a new set of norms, consisting essentially of a digest
42Queijsen, meeting of 12 May 1815, Van Maanen (1887, 40).
43Bornewasser (1983b, 230), Van Sas (1981, 289).
44Armitage (2012, 135–153).
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of state practice. They did not automatically derive from theological concepts. The
age of 19th century “positivism”, as it is often described45 or criticized by
present-day legal theorists46 was in the ﬁrst place a product of continuity with 17th
and 18th century categories. Both naturalist and realist authors were common, from
Zouche and Rachel to Wolff and Pufendorf, or from Vitoria and Suárez to Moser
and Martens.47 The dichotomy between authors according priority to state practice
or to the world of ideas is eternal. The Vienna Congress is attributed a milestone role in
the history of international law for the installation of a collective security-system. Yet,
this position is subject to criticism. The institutional innovations of 1815 were scarce.48
The system ultimately collapsed due to the incessant waves of internal challenges, or
what contemporaries called the resurgence of the French Revolutionary heritage as the
‘nationality principle’. Doctrinal evolutions from Klüber (1762–1837) to Bluntschli
(1808–1881) should be seen as a continuum, with the latter starting point still entrenched
in Old Regime reasoning and exempla.
Whereas the 1815 constitution gives a blanco mandate to the King, most Old
Regime theorists had pleaded for bottom-up limitations on royal power, through
national representation. Grotius,49 Pufendorf and Vattel50 closely associated the
social corpus with important external decisions. Cutting off part of the population
from the others, with whom they had been associated in the same society, would be
impossible for Pufendorf.51 A moral corpus, such as a state, was only the result of
its members’ consent. Only their intention could guide the judgement of external
actions. Who could argue that the founders of any society between men would have
committed the folly to attribute the competence to alienate ad libitum? In case of
occupation by a third power, the population could exercise its natural right to revolt.
Vattel offered a complementary angle. Conformably to the French theory of
limits on monarchical power through the lois fondamentales, no ‘Prince or sover-
eign can naturally been called the owner of his State. He is only its caretaker. The
dignity of head of state does not confer the right to alienate’.52 Vattel’s afﬁrmation
of the ruler’s competence as the beneﬁciary of a usufruct was in line with French
domestic constitutional tradition in the Old Regime.53 In 1713, the Parliament of
Paris used this principle to oppose Louis XIV’s wish to have his grandson abdicate
his natural right of succession to the French throne. The Revolution did away with
45García-Salmones (2013).
46Koskenniemi (2001).
47Brown Scott (1911–1953).
48Jarrett (2013, 358).
49Haggenmacher (2013).
50Jouannet (1998), Chetail and Haggenmacher (2011).
51Pufendorf (1735).
52Vattel (1758, I, 226–227).
53See also Raepsaet’s use of Grotius, De iure belli ac Pacis, III, XX, nr.5 as introduction to the
‘Observations d’un Belge sur le sort éventuel des Pays-Bas Autrichiens’ Raepsaet (1838, 220):
The monarch does not hold his authority from a right of full property, but only in usufruct.
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this, as the people-roi was now governing itself. Louis XVIII, who succeeded his
brother Louis XVI in 1814, was able to lift this old theoretical limit on monarchical
power. In spite of the allegation of the perpetuity of the Bourbon dynasty across
political regimes, Louis XVIII was freer than his predecessors had been.54
Speciﬁc cases in European diplomatic history corroborated these ideas. In June
1720, George I of Britain promised the cession of Gibraltar to Philip V of Spain.
The British monarch communicated a letter through his secretary of state James
Stanhope. The cession would take place du consentement de mon parlement. In the
eyes of Philip V, this constituted an enforcable international promise. Yet, George I
retrenched behind the impossibility to act without the consent of Parliament,
arguing that territorial cessions required the application of the “King in
Parliament”-principle.55 Likewise, after Charles XII’s destructive defeat in the
Great Northern War, the Swedish Riksdag modiﬁed the constitution in such a way
as to impose the participation of the Estates in peacemaking.56
5 Leave Us as We Are: Jan-Jozef Raepsaet
the Constitution as a Pactum
C’est une maxime de sagesse et de prudence dans un Législateur, que celle qui porte:
Laissez-nous tels que nous sommes.57
Raepsaet, the Constitution’s main conservative critic, was trained in utriusque
juris at the University of Louvain, where he obtained prizes for rhetorical excel-
lence. It is no surprise that he considered history and literature as essential hand-
maidens for the exercise of the legal profession. He claimed that Flemish customs
of public law went back to the seventh century.58 His career as revolutionary and
icon of protest turned around completely. He became a member, and even president
of the Conseil Général in the Department of the Scheldt. Later on, he was even
called up as a member of the Corps Législatif in Paris.59 Although Raepsaet seemed
to have spent his time mainly on studying in the various libraries of the capital, his
enrolment in the Napoleonic system is not without signiﬁcance. Pledging allegiance
to the parvenu-Emperor of France, or being present at his self-coronation in the
Notre Dame, where the pope was humiliated, did constitute a rupture with the Old
Régime-traditions Raepsaet advocated throughout his Austrian period.
Raepsaet was a specialist of feudal law. An elaborate essay on inaugurations in
the Southern Netherlands ranks among his main publications. This text was written
on purpose, in order to tie William I to the Old Regime idea of contractual
54Mansel (2004, 210–211), Evans (2016, 30).
55Dhondt (2015, 238).
56Vattel (1758, II, 256), Mattéi (2006, 152).
57Raepsaet (1838, 227).
58Dhondt (2001, III, 21).
59As one of the 26 Belgian members. Devleeshouwer (1983, 200).
Inaugurating a Dutch Napoleon? 267
monarchy.60 Raepsaet personally met William I in September 1814. During six
quarters of an hour, Raepsaet recalled popular dissatisfaction, the virtues of the old
constitution and government and the ideal new system.61 A meeting between these
two ﬁgures was logical. During the Revolt against Joseph II, Raepsaet had been
advocating that the constitutions of the County of Flanders, a disparate hodgepodge
of incidental documents and declarations, held the same rank as that of the Duchy
of Brabant. Under the Austrian restoration (1790–1792), Raepsaet was charged
with the draft of a new constitution for Flanders.
In Raepsaet’s mind, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was of a double
nature. On the one hand, the creation of a new state corresponded to the necessity of
a titre légal in the Public Law of Europe. The diplomatic creation of the Kingdom
can thus never be seen in a solely domestic perspective. International circumstances
are co-creators and are never of a purely declaratory nature. Foremost in the case of
the ‘théâtre naturel des guerres du continent’.62 If the Great Powers had consented
in the transfer of the Southern Netherlands from Spain to Austria in 1713–1715, the
same ought to apply a century later.63 Loyalty did not reside in his faith in the
House of Habsburg, but in his loyalty towards institutions. Raepsaet’s incidental
laments on the Vienna Congress, where ‘on se serait permis de traiter de nous et
sans nous, par un simple article […] sur des bases convenues avec le prince
d’Orange, avant qu’il ne fut notre souverain’ should thus not be overstressed.64
On the other hand, Raepsaet argued that a change in international circumstances
could not invalidate internal traditions. The old constitutions of the Southern
Netherlands were the compass of political action.65 They had been reafﬁrmed time
and time again, in 1715 as well as in 1790.66 Louis XIV had even conserved them
when he conquered parts of French-speaking Flanders.67 Raepsaet even went so far
as to deny any uniﬁcation intention to the Spanish and Austrian rulers of the
Southern Netherlands.68 The Code Civil of Napoleon had only been a vain attempt
to abolish the formal authority of Roman law, ordinances and customs. Their spirit
60Cornelissen (1841, XXII).
61A proposal to sit on the monarch’s Council of State was declined. After his Napoleonic
responsibilities, Raepsaet preferred the calm of his local Oudenaarde.
62Raepsaet (1838, 127, 205).
63Raepsaet (1838, 225).
64Raepsaet (1838, 177). See as well his accusations of corruption against the British ambassador
Clancarty, who would have obtained the marquisat of Heusden (near Ghent) in exchange for an
unequal burden-sharing between North and South. See, on this topic: Judo (2007).
65See also Anon (1814).
66Convention relative to the Affairs of the Austrian Netherlands between Austria and Great Britain,
the Netherlands and Prussia, The Hague, 10 December 1790, Parry (1969–1981, vol. 51, 71),
Raepsaet (1838, 212).
67Raepsaet (1838, 240).
68Raepsaet (1838, 242).
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had been explicitly acknowledged by the Code’s authors as the true inspiration.69
Uniformisation of regions as different as Frise, Hainault or Flanders would be
doomed beforehand. A commercial code, for instance, had never been necessary in
the heyday of Bruges, Ghent or Antwerp. Even more, the customs of the stock
exchange had travelled to Amsterdam!70
Raepsaet’s plea for upholding the spirit of Old Regime diversity was perfectly
congruent with the conservative perspective of the legitimacy-principle of the
Vienna Congress. Customs and traditions provided internal stability, whereas
treaties consecrated the external aspect of sovereignty, starting with state recogni-
tion. William’s use of an assembly of appointed “notables” to endorse the consti-
tution, seemed outright absurd. The Belgian nation had no other representatives but
the three orders of the traditional estates in every province.71 Happiness and opu-
lence were the logical consequences of the good government of ancient constitu-
tions.72 Certainly in contrast with the chaotic succession of constitutions in France.
Even more, its countryside nobility had always been perceived by the population as
protectors, benefactors and “fathers” of the villages under their jurisdiction.73
Raepsaet was not a mere advocate of a return to the Old Regime. He did
integrate the necessity of a new state. There was an explicit need for a ‘centre de
circonvallation’ to the North of France.74 Even more, if a change in statehood
would turn out to be beneﬁciary to the Southern Netherlands, the constitution could
and ought to be modiﬁed. William’s attempt to regenerate the XVII provinces was,
after all, an adaptation of Charles V’s Pragmatic Sanction (1549), which considered
the Low Countries as a single inheritance. Yet, within this new framework,
Raepsaet pleaded for a return of the societal forces that had been present since the
Middle Ages. Or, in more fashionable 18th century terms, for a cooperation of elites
as defended by Montesquieu.75 The estates’ cooperation in legislative power, or the
administration of the treasury was as self-evident as that to wage war or conclude
peace. In modern terms, we could call him an advocate of subsidiarity and
multi-level governance within the composite United Kingdom of the Netherlands.
A common constitution was necessary, but integration did not need to go beyond
69‘Suivant cet avis, le code n’est qu’une analyse de la loi romaine; l’on accorde force de loi à
l’analyse de la loi, mais on refuse force de loi à la loi même; et tandis qu’on accorde force de loi à
l’analyse, on reconnaît qu’elle est insufﬁsante sans le concours de la loi qu’on a abolie.´ The code
would furthermore generate nothing but disorders: ‘ces codes, qui ne laissent guère que droit
romain ou la force de la raison écrite, autorisent un juge à trouver sa raison meilleure que celle de
Papinien.’ Raepsaet (1838, 243).
70Raepsaet (1838, 250), De ruysscher (2009).
71Raepsaet (1838, 121).
72Raepsaet (1838, 227).
73Point made by de Thiennes and de Mérode. Raepsaet (1838, 151).
74Raepsaet (1838, 221).
75Dhondt (2001, VI, 201).
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what was required to maintain ‘la considération et l’influence dans la Balance de
l’Europe […] nécessaires pour nos intérêts commerciaux et politiques’.76
Raepsaet saw the new Constitution as a Pactum between the monarch and the
representative forces in society. Consent was explicit in the inauguration ceremony.
The monarch should be recalled regularly of the theoretical foundations of his
powers. He relied explicitly on Grotius and Vattel to sustain this point.77
In sum, William’s sovereignty relied on two elements: ‘titre légal’ (interna-
tionally conferred) and ‘anciennes lois et coutumes.’78 Unfortunately for him, the
advantages of French-style centralized administration had conquered the minds of
his interlocutors, passive Belgians and vigorous Dutchmen alike.79 This was per-
ceivable to the ultimate degree: the award of a near-unlimited competence in for-
eign affairs, designed to ﬁt one single man, irrespective of his successors.80
6 Epilogue: The Eclipse of the Monarchical Principle
The Belgian Constitution of 1831 broke with the speciﬁc deﬁciencies of William I’s
constitution. The revolt of local elites and young graduates was a consequence of
the unequal distribution of favours and positions within the army and administra-
tion.81 The document approved in February 1831 by an elected National Congress
explicitly turned the order of priorities upside down. William’s sovereignty had
preceded the constitutions of 1814 and 1815. The Belgian people, represented in
Congress, established the nation’s sovereignty before any ruler could personify or
represent the state. Establishing this sovereignty, however, in view of the Southern
Netherlands’ delicate position on the European chessboard, was an external as well
as an internal affair. France applauded the reduction of the buffer state designed
against it in 1814–1815. Britain could support the liberal principles behind the
insurrection, as far as Belgium would observe a strict neutrality.
76Raepsaet (1838, 222).
77This is no surprise. Vattel’s popularity in 19th century thought is a corollary of the political
structure of the Republic of Neuchâtel. Vattel’s home state was ruled at a distance from 1707 on.
Consequently, Vattel advocated local sovereignty throughout his work, Dhondt (2015b). See also
the use of Bynkershoek by Raepsaet on the question of wartime indemnities for the civilian
population, Raepsaet (1838, 126, 222–224).
78Raepsaet (1838, 222), adding Montesquieu’s conservative appreciation of custom as the source
of a nation’s felicity, and Grotius’ similar point of view, conﬁrmed by the ‘authority’ of Cicero.
79Olcina (2010, 36).
80Raepsaet (1838, 163): ‘que le roi, par diverses considérations, et surtout dans la situation
actuelle du royaume, pourrait se trouver personnellement trop faible pour résister aux instances
pressantes de puissances voisines.’
81This ran against article 11’s promise of equal treatment between the King’s subjects for
appointments in public service, Witte (2016b).
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The ill-reflected general delegation of powers to the monarch uncoupled the
administrative Napoleonic tradition from the popular legitimacy made necessary by
the French Revolution. As the constitution’s preamble stated, the ‘person of the
monarch’, had been the object and purpose of negotiations. This is striking, com-
pared with the criticism addressed to Joseph II. We shall only quote erstwhile
insurrection leader Hendrik Van der Noot (1731–1827)’s ‘Si nous avons un prince
c’est aﬁn qu’il nous préserve d’avoir un maître.’82 The nation was not consulted in
the South. Individual freedoms and liberties were numerous, but the urge to ensure
‘the freedom of persons, the security of property, and all civil privileges’, was not
very different from the recipe used by Napoleon to urge ﬁgures as Raepsaet to
participate in the French regime.
Although little discussed during the National Congress session, Art. 67 of the
1831 Belgian Constitution put brakes on monarchical power in foreign affairs. This
was a consequence of the now generalized primacy of the legislative branch. Art.
67 should be seen in the context of judicial review by courts and tribunals of acts of
the executive branch, or the introduction of ministerial responsibility.
This general liberal tendency can be found in Thorbecke’s commentary on the
1815 constitution, which appeared in 1839. The distinction between wartime and
peacetime territorial cessions was absurd and without meaning, according to the
Dutch constitutionalist, who had taught in Ghent, as well as in Leiden.83 The
overarching structure of the constitution commanded to treat any alteration of
territory as an outright modiﬁcation of the document itself. Practically speaking, the
monarch’s hands would equally be tied in wartime, since the national representation
had the—theoretical—possibility to oppose a modiﬁcation of the constitution.
Diplomatic practice attributed a larger role to Belgium’s new King, Leopold of
Saxe-Cobourg. Thanks to his political and military experience, as well as his ties to
both ruling houses in London and Paris, the monarch’s negotiating position was
without comparison to that of civil ministers or diplomats. Parliamentary control of
the settlement of the nation’s borders was a ﬁction. In his commentary on the
Belgian constitution, Thonissen stated that most diplomatic information was
generically unsuitable for divulgation in the public arena.84 Jean Stengers equaled
Leopold I’s mental conception of foreign policy to that of an Old Regime prince.85
Yet, the domestic legal architecture behind the exercise of his competences differed
substantially from that of “monocrat” William I.86
82Dhondt (2001, V, 42).
83Thorbecke (1839, 69).
84Thonissen (1844, 202).
85Stengers (1996, 248).
86Gilissen (1979b, 131).
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